Suhas Chakma - Bangladesh: A point of no return
The strikes called by the Bangladesh National
Party (BNP)-led 20 party alliance since 5 January demanding the resignation of
the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami
League(AL) government and holding of midterm elections under a neutral
caretaker government appear to be losing steam. Despite the deaths of over 100
people and detention of over 7,000 opposition political activists and house
arrest of Khaleda Zia, none in the international community has supported
the BNP’s demands. Instead the BNP has been called upon to sever ties with the
Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaats).
The BNP, lacking the ability to enforce its strikes, however
continues to rely on the Jamaat’s machinery and insurgency-style tactics
to target civilians in the fire-bombing of the vehicles, train derailment,
arson etc. Nonetheless, targeted violence still remains vicious as the murder
of blogger and writer Avijit Roy on the night of 26 February by alleged Islamic
fundamentalists suggests.
The ongoing crisis is not just another episode in the
long-running “battle of the begums” between Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, or
simply a manifestation of the country’s immature democratic culture. It is
actually a continuation of the civil war started
during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War between the AL, which led the
liberation war, and the Jamaat leaders who perpetrated war crimes to oppose the
independence of Bangladesh.
This civil war had actually never ended. The parliament of
Bangladesh enacted the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 to establish
accountability of the war criminals but most Jamaat leaders fled to Pakistan. Following the assassination of Mujibur Rahman, leader of the
liberation war on 15 August 1975, General Ziaur Rahman went on to rehabilitate
the Jamaats who became part of the multi-party alliance for the restoration of
democracy after his assassination in 1980. The war between the liberation
forces and anti-liberation forces remained dormant during the pro-democracy
movement.
NB: 'This civil war had actually never ended..' is a profound observation; and is relevant to the partition of India, not only the partition of Pakistan. The civil war was launched and is carried on by all kinds of communalists, is directed against the forces of secular democracy, and is meant to maintain the region's politics in the grip of military-industrial ruling elites.
Following the fall of General HM Ershad in 1990, the Jamaats
became a natural ally of the late Ziaur Rahman's party, the BNP and extended
support to the BNP to form the government after the 1991 general elections. The
pro-liberation forces led by the "Ekattorer Ghatak-Dalal Nirmul
Committee" demanded the trial of Jamaat leaders but the BNP was not
expected to take any measure against its alliance partners. The AL which was in
power from 1996 to 2001 also ignored the accountability of war criminals.
The return of the BNP and the Jamaat alliance to power after
the 2001 elections was marked by massive attacks on Hindu minorities while
support to Indian insurgents including the United Liberation Front of Assam
during this period became a matter of state policy. Most importantly, despite
being in power, the Jamaats sought to eliminate the AL from Bangladesh -- an
unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on the life of Sheikh Hasina in a
grenade attack on 21 August 2004 while the AL’s former Finance Minister SAM
Shamsul Kibria was killed in a similar grenade attack on 27 January 2005.
The intervention by the Bangladesh Army on 7 January 2007
following disagreement between the AL and the BNP over the caretaker government
to conduct the elections however changed the situation. The military-backed
caretaker government not only launched an anti-corruption crackdown
on the Bangladeshi political elite but also arrested Begum Zia and her two
sons, Arafat Rahman and Tarique Rahman with the latter being subjected to
torture including being allegedly suspended from a ceiling on 31 December 2007.
Considering the arrest, detention and torture of many BNP
leaders including Tarique Rahman, the Bangladesh Army feared reprisals in the
event of the BNP coming to power in the next parliamentary elections slated for
29 December 2008. The Bangladesh Army openly supported the AL, for the first
time since the 1975 coup d'état and assassination of Mujibur Rahman, and the
AL’s victory in the elections became a foregone conclusion. The BNP, already
battered by the Bangladesh Army, accepted the election results.
However, the AL was not allowed to settle down. In the
Pilkhana massacre on 25 February 2009, the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) personnel
massacred 74 people including 57 army officers deputed to the BDR. The Jamaat’s
role in the Pilkhana massacre was suspected. The AL not only saw the massacre
as an attempt to dislodge its government but also an attempt to oust the AL
from the country by any means.
The AL government took a number of measures to counter the
Jamaats. In order to bring the Army on its side, the Army was allowed to take
revenge on the BDR personnel accused in the Pilkhana massacre -- about 70 BDR
personnel were murdered in Army custody while 152 others were sentenced to
death. The AL further established War Crimes Tribunals with the sole aim to take
Jamaat leaders out of circulation that the Jamaats had originally set up for
the AL leaders. Most importantly, the AL amended the constitution of Bangladesh
in 2011 to repeal the system of caretaker governments conducting parliamentary
elections and to solidify its rule. In fact, when the AL won the deeply flawed
elections on 5th January 2014 boycotted by the BNP, the international community
in a clear rebuff to the sort of regime change being pushed for by the BNP
recognised the victory of the AL.
Bangladesh has reached the point of no return. Of the
thirteen Jamaat leaders sentenced to death by the War Crimes Tribunals, only
Abdul Quader Molla had been hanged so far. The hanging of the remaining twelve
is likely to intensify the civil war. On the other hand, any return of the
Jamaats to power on the back of the BNP will surely lead to unprecedented
backlash against the AL and the Hindu minorities.
In this civil war between the liberation forces, who are by
definition the ultra nationalists, and the anti-liberation forces, the BNP as
the claimant of Bangladeshi nationalism faces an identity crisis. What is more
troubling is the failure of Begum Zia to realise that the demand for guarantees
for ensuring free and fair elections for the 2019 elections is more likely to
be supported by international community than a midterm election, which means
reversal of the decisions taken to recognise the elections of January 2014.
Asking Khaleda Zia to wait for another four years is akin to asking her to
become a Bangladeshi Kejriwal, which is an unlikely prospect. But the prospects
for a continuing undeclared civil war are certain.
The author is Director, Asian Centre for Human Rights
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