Ajai Sahni: Blind Escalation
retaliatory strikes – whatever their nature and efficacy – against terrorist targets and their sponsors are not a novelty in the global scenario; but such incidents are not ordinarily transformed into a political carnival by the states that engineer them... there is also no wild escalation, no imperative imposed on the adversary to save face by seeking dramatic retribution. This is how retaliatory actions are handled. Not by Prime Ministers and political parties turning them into centrepieces of their election campaigns; not by dancing and celebrations in the streets. The reason for this is simple. Military escalations occur in relative secrecy..
Terrorist facilities
in Pakistan have been bombed numberless times by the US, and there is little
need to mention the Abottabad attack, where US Navy Seals flew over 200
kilometres into Pakistani airspace to ‘take out’ Osama bin Laden from a
location just a stone’s throw away from the Kakul Military Academy. This is a
process that has continued for over eighteen years, since the immediate
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, and the ensuing Operation
Enduring Freedom. Pakistan’s support to terrorism, and specifically to the
Taliban-Haqqani network campaigns in Afghanistan, in which at least 2,419
American soldiers have been killed, among a total of 3,561 Coalition, as well as
tens of thousands of Afghan Forces’ and civilian fatalities.
No amount of
pressure has, however, forced Pakistan to back off from its support to
terrorism against Kabul. Today, with the Americans suing for a face saving
flight from Afghanistan, Pakistan stands on the cusp of what it views as an
inevitable victory. That India’s political
leadership could have believed that a single air strike on a terrorist training
camp could have significantly altered Pakistan’s strategic disposition reflects
the degree to which fantasy dominates the ideologically driven political
imagination.
The aerial strike
against the Balakot terrorist camp, in itself, cannot be faulted as due
retaliation for the Pulawama outrage, or at the level of its operational
planning and execution by the Air Force. It is after this point that the plot
unravels from the Indian perspective.
First, as with the ‘Surgical Strikes’ of
2016, no calculus of strategic gain, or of closure, is visible. Second, and
crucially, retaliatory strikes – whatever their nature and efficacy – against
terrorist targets and their sponsors are not a novelty in the global scenario;
but such incidents are not ordinarily transformed into a political carnival by
the states that engineer them.
The incident occurs, and its targets are
immediately and well aware of it; after a period of silence, related evidence
is quietly shared with those who matter – intelligence agencies and diplomats
of friendly or influential states, key elements in the media and other
significant nodes of communication. Soon enough, there is no doubt in anyone’s
mind about what happened – but there is also no wild escalation, no imperative
imposed on the adversary to save face by seeking dramatic retribution. This is
how retaliatory actions are handled. Not by Prime Ministers and political
parties turning them into centrepieces of their election campaigns; not by
dancing and celebrations in the streets.
The reason for this is
simple. Military escalations occur in relative secrecy – a private (and bloody)
conversation between the armed forces of the two adversarial powers, albeit
constantly mandated by political sanction in a democratic system. The result
is, military escalation can be, and usually is, narrowly calibrated, and the
options of quickly ratcheting down the escalatory ladder are numerous.
Decision-making is not encumbered by the pressures of the street, and is
defined essentially in terms of strategic assessments of costs and benefits.
Once the confrontation
is transformed into a jingoistic electoral-political spectacle, however, saving
or losing face becomes the sole or dominant rationale of the action-reaction
cycle. As compared to a military escalation, the uncertainties are infinitely
greater in a political escalation. Crucially, India’s
poor handling of public and global perceptions is resulting in a rapid erosion
of credibility. Here, it is useful to reiterate that Pakistan has talked peace
and waged covert war against the US for nearly two decades and against India
for almost four (indeed, if their support to the insurgencies of the Northeast
is taken into account, for nearly seven). They have raised deceit and deception
virtually to the level of an art form, and unless the leadership at New Delhi
is able to harness evidence and restraint to counter Islamabad’s devious
posturing, they will find their credibility quickly challenged, both
domestically and internationally.
It is useful to
examine Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s projections in this regard. In the
wake of the Indian claim on the bombing of terrorist camps at Balakot, Khan was
aggressive and lucid in his threats of retaliation. In the wake of the claims
and counter-claims on the subsequent aerial skirmish in which Pakistan appears
to have got the upper hand in terms of perceptions, with one Indian plane
confirmed downed by the Pakistanis, and an Indian pilot in Pakistani custody,
Khan shifted tack, and gave a ‘statesmanlike’ speech – from a position of clear
tactical advantage – calling for restraint and peace.
On the other hand,
India’s triumphalism has quickly given way to apparent bewilderment, with its
leadership, media and public discourse appearing petulant, out of control, and
substantially committed to blind escalation. It is clear that neither side can
be seen to back off in the wake of a tactical success by the other. It is
equally clear that neither side is prepared for a full scale war.
Consequently, unless
the entire discourse and military cycle can be taken off the streets and off a
largely hysterical, ignorant and jingoistic media – in both countries – we
appear to be committed to a new normal: just as daily and escalating exchanges of
fire have become the norm along the Line of Control and International Border in
Jammu & Kashmir, so, frequent aerial skirmishes and tactical attacks across
the LoC, with purposeless losses on each side, will increase.
Terrorism in Jammu and
Kashmir did not commence with the suicide bombing at Pulwama on February 14,
2019. It will not end in a flurry of Indian tactical successes. India’s
leadership focuses on the challenge of Pakistan-backed terrorism fitfully, in
the wake of major attacks, and then, quickly, loses sight of the enduring
strategic challenge. This cycle has kept Pakistan’s strategy alive for decades
now. Unless a protracted conflict paradigm embeds itself in New Delhi’s
strategic orientation, the noise of the current crisis will produce no significant
gains.
