Babar Ayaz - What’s Wrong With Pakistan?,
Near the beginning of his book, What’s Wrong With Pakistan?, eminent Pakistani journalist Babar Ayaz offers a diagnosis that the country has a genetic defect. He uses this as a basis to look at why Pakistan has remained a dysfunctional state and how its state of affairs continues to be in conflict with ‘twenty-first century value systems’. Excerpts from an interview with Open’s Rahul Pandita.
Q Your book offers an insight into how successive rulers in Pakistan have succumbed to what you call the ‘confused theory of Iqbal’—that religion and State should not be separated. Does that lie at the core of what ails Pakistan today?
A When so much goes wrong with [a] country and it remains, after 65 years, dysfunctional, then it is a serious issue. My view has been for a long time—much before I started writing this book—that we have to find the fundamental reason why we are what we are. And then I realised that once you exploit religion and [create] political formulations [based on] it to make a country, then that formulation is going to... set the future course. The ruling classes of Pakistan, the establishment of Pakistan, [have] used it at different times to achieve their own projects. The problem is that leaders use it for short-term gains. Now this is not something [that] only [happens in] Pakistan. Look at the United States, with all its vision and think-tanks and what not, and how it committed [the] fundamental mistake of using religion and religious militancy in Afghanistan. [And] what is happening? The mechanism set by it is today eating the Americans.
Q You argue in the book that Pakistan suffered because of a ‘strategic collapse of Jinnah’s strategy’ to use the idea of Pakistan as a bargaining tool. But several researchers have argued otherwise—that for the Muslim League, the idea of Pakistan was very clear as the ‘new Medina’.
A If you see the documents… it is different [from] what the speeches [say]. And at times I see researchers putting too much emphasis on speeches. Speeches are made for public consumption. When you read the documents, they are very clear that what the Muslim League was asking for was basically maximum autonomy for the provinces that had a Muslim majority, and maximum autonomy for Muslims in provinces where they were in a minority.
And then there were [other] crucial demands: 33 per cent representation in the legislative assembly. And that the minorities... any minorities... if 75 per cent of them do not vote for a particular clause of the Constitution, then that clause will not go through. And the third was: we will get 33 per cent share [of] jobs. These were the issues—all documented—that people do not talk about. But Mr [Jawaharlal] Nehru did not accept it. The country got divided.
Come to 1971. In front of Pakistan’s legislative assembly, Mr [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto wanted certain assurances from the majority party, the Awami League. But the Awami League did not agree. What happened? The country broke.
Fast forward—what happened in Egypt? [Mohamed] Morsi tried to implement a majoritarian constitution. He said: ‘we will have a referendum.’ But that was not representative—hardly 22 per cent of all people. What happened? Total chaos.
So you have to carry on with fundamental documents in a large-hearted way. I’ll give an example that is not usually liked by all three religions—that had Jews had a bigger heart, Christianity and Islam would have been two sects of Judaism. Same in India with Buddhism.
You need to have vision. Somebody told me the other day that Jinnah did not see it. I said, ‘Yes, but even Nehru did not see it’. But Maulana Azad could foresee it. So for that, an Oxford education is not necessary (laughs).
Q You have quoted various theses to argue that extremism is deeply embedded in Pakistan’s DNA. But was it clear from the beginning? Or did it really become clear from Zia’s regime?
A I would go back. I [would] say, because we used or exploited religion for getting public support when Pakistan was made, obviously Islamism was one narrative. As a result, the government, because it had propagated [Islam], had to give [it] space. .. read more:
http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/nation/ideologies-do-not-stop-at-cantonment-gates
‘What’s wrong with Pakistan?: New book lauded for its journey into uncharted waters
Q Your book offers an insight into how successive rulers in Pakistan have succumbed to what you call the ‘confused theory of Iqbal’—that religion and State should not be separated. Does that lie at the core of what ails Pakistan today?
A When so much goes wrong with [a] country and it remains, after 65 years, dysfunctional, then it is a serious issue. My view has been for a long time—much before I started writing this book—that we have to find the fundamental reason why we are what we are. And then I realised that once you exploit religion and [create] political formulations [based on] it to make a country, then that formulation is going to... set the future course. The ruling classes of Pakistan, the establishment of Pakistan, [have] used it at different times to achieve their own projects. The problem is that leaders use it for short-term gains. Now this is not something [that] only [happens in] Pakistan. Look at the United States, with all its vision and think-tanks and what not, and how it committed [the] fundamental mistake of using religion and religious militancy in Afghanistan. [And] what is happening? The mechanism set by it is today eating the Americans.
Q You argue in the book that Pakistan suffered because of a ‘strategic collapse of Jinnah’s strategy’ to use the idea of Pakistan as a bargaining tool. But several researchers have argued otherwise—that for the Muslim League, the idea of Pakistan was very clear as the ‘new Medina’.
A If you see the documents… it is different [from] what the speeches [say]. And at times I see researchers putting too much emphasis on speeches. Speeches are made for public consumption. When you read the documents, they are very clear that what the Muslim League was asking for was basically maximum autonomy for the provinces that had a Muslim majority, and maximum autonomy for Muslims in provinces where they were in a minority.
And then there were [other] crucial demands: 33 per cent representation in the legislative assembly. And that the minorities... any minorities... if 75 per cent of them do not vote for a particular clause of the Constitution, then that clause will not go through. And the third was: we will get 33 per cent share [of] jobs. These were the issues—all documented—that people do not talk about. But Mr [Jawaharlal] Nehru did not accept it. The country got divided.
Come to 1971. In front of Pakistan’s legislative assembly, Mr [Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto wanted certain assurances from the majority party, the Awami League. But the Awami League did not agree. What happened? The country broke.
Fast forward—what happened in Egypt? [Mohamed] Morsi tried to implement a majoritarian constitution. He said: ‘we will have a referendum.’ But that was not representative—hardly 22 per cent of all people. What happened? Total chaos.
So you have to carry on with fundamental documents in a large-hearted way. I’ll give an example that is not usually liked by all three religions—that had Jews had a bigger heart, Christianity and Islam would have been two sects of Judaism. Same in India with Buddhism.
You need to have vision. Somebody told me the other day that Jinnah did not see it. I said, ‘Yes, but even Nehru did not see it’. But Maulana Azad could foresee it. So for that, an Oxford education is not necessary (laughs).
Q You have quoted various theses to argue that extremism is deeply embedded in Pakistan’s DNA. But was it clear from the beginning? Or did it really become clear from Zia’s regime?
A I would go back. I [would] say, because we used or exploited religion for getting public support when Pakistan was made, obviously Islamism was one narrative. As a result, the government, because it had propagated [Islam], had to give [it] space. .. read more:
http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/nation/ideologies-do-not-stop-at-cantonment-gates
‘What’s wrong with Pakistan?: New book lauded for its journey into uncharted waters
