His Holiness forgets himself
NB: The Dalai Lama (whom I hold in the highest regard); has now begun passing judgements on India's partition, which he should not have done without ascertaining scholarly opinion other than that of the reigning common sense. He now claims that India's partition was a result of Nehru's selfish refusal to accept the Gandhi Plan (that proposed to offer Prime Ministership to M.A. Jinnah). I don't know whether His Holiness has studied the historical record but this (with suitable ideological changes) is also the refrain of the Sangh Parivar and other extremists who like to substitute history with propaganda. Here's Modi in 2014
Did not British machinations, the heavily communalised atmosphere and Jinnah's insistence on the Pakistan demand make any difference? Since this matter keeps cropping up again and again, I will provide some references (and add material later) for those who can be bothered to study prior to making oracular statements. The Gandhi Plan envisaged Jinnah's taking over the reins of the GoI until the British left; after which all differences amongst Indians could be resolved. It entailed Congress support for a Jinnah-led government whose composition would be left to Jinnah, provided it functioned in the interests of all Indians. It also required dismantling of the Muslim National Guard and all private armies; and stipulated the freedom of the League to campaign for Pakistan even before the total transfer of power, as long as it abjured violence. (See Narayan Desai's My life is My Message, vol 4, 345-346)
Mountbatten expressed sympathy for the idea after an initial meeting with Gandhi in March 1947. But he never took it further, which Gandhi expected him to do. His support (or the lack of it) was crucial at this point for the scheme to succeed. Those sections of the colonial officials who knew this banked upon delays and machinations to stop it emerging as a serious alternative. It was sabotaged by the bureaucracy, not by Nehru. This was because it viewed the League as an ally, but was antagonistic to the Congress - especially after the 1942 events - and because for them exiting from India was by then their priority, not the unity of the country.
It is also true that Gandhi failed to convince the Congress leadership in the important CWC meeting in early May. Amongst them Patel - and to a lesser extent Nehru - were exasperated by the experience of working with the League in the Interim government of 1946. Gandhi and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan were opposed in principle to partition. As regards the Cabinet Mission, which is the favourite chestnut of those who seek to place all blame for all bad things on Nehru, Gandhi etc; it is worth remembering that the CPI made a detailed critique of this plan as a scheme for Princestan, wherein the British would retain a military presence in India's princely states, well-known for their subservience to colonial interests.
I will add more to these points in due course; including Ambedkar's position on the Muslim League's demands from the late 1930's onward. Details of the Gandhi Plan and its failure may be read in Narayan Desai's Gandhi biography: My life is my message, vol 4, chapter 15; Alan Campbell-Johnson's Mission with Mountbatten p 52; (as Mountbatten's Press Attache); and Pyarelal's Gandhi: the Last Phase, vol 10, part 2, pp 79-80.
I will also remind His Holiness that it is not a coincidence that China chose to humiliate Nehru after the latter gave refuge to His Holiness and his accompanying Tibetan refugees fleeing from Chinese aggression in 1959. And that it is the BJP led government under Vajpayee that gave the final seal of India's approval to Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. All Indian governments prior to that left some scope for Tibet's autonomous existence. Here's material on the BJP and Modi's hypocrisy on this matter. The 2003 Sino-Indian Joint
declaration was the furthest India has gone to accept China's sovereignty over
Tibet. One view of this is that Vajpayee went this distance in
acknowledging Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in exchange for Chinese acceptance
of Sikkim as part of India. Another view is that Vajpayee sold out Indian
interests. From either perspective, 2003 statement was a gain for China. What
is noteworthy is that China refers to Arunachal Pradesh as 'South Tibet' - and
that the 2003 declaration strengthened its capacity to do so. DS
Also see:
Did not British machinations, the heavily communalised atmosphere and Jinnah's insistence on the Pakistan demand make any difference? Since this matter keeps cropping up again and again, I will provide some references (and add material later) for those who can be bothered to study prior to making oracular statements. The Gandhi Plan envisaged Jinnah's taking over the reins of the GoI until the British left; after which all differences amongst Indians could be resolved. It entailed Congress support for a Jinnah-led government whose composition would be left to Jinnah, provided it functioned in the interests of all Indians. It also required dismantling of the Muslim National Guard and all private armies; and stipulated the freedom of the League to campaign for Pakistan even before the total transfer of power, as long as it abjured violence. (See Narayan Desai's My life is My Message, vol 4, 345-346)
Mountbatten expressed sympathy for the idea after an initial meeting with Gandhi in March 1947. But he never took it further, which Gandhi expected him to do. His support (or the lack of it) was crucial at this point for the scheme to succeed. Those sections of the colonial officials who knew this banked upon delays and machinations to stop it emerging as a serious alternative. It was sabotaged by the bureaucracy, not by Nehru. This was because it viewed the League as an ally, but was antagonistic to the Congress - especially after the 1942 events - and because for them exiting from India was by then their priority, not the unity of the country.
It is also true that Gandhi failed to convince the Congress leadership in the important CWC meeting in early May. Amongst them Patel - and to a lesser extent Nehru - were exasperated by the experience of working with the League in the Interim government of 1946. Gandhi and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan were opposed in principle to partition. As regards the Cabinet Mission, which is the favourite chestnut of those who seek to place all blame for all bad things on Nehru, Gandhi etc; it is worth remembering that the CPI made a detailed critique of this plan as a scheme for Princestan, wherein the British would retain a military presence in India's princely states, well-known for their subservience to colonial interests.
I will add more to these points in due course; including Ambedkar's position on the Muslim League's demands from the late 1930's onward. Details of the Gandhi Plan and its failure may be read in Narayan Desai's Gandhi biography: My life is my message, vol 4, chapter 15; Alan Campbell-Johnson's Mission with Mountbatten p 52; (as Mountbatten's Press Attache); and Pyarelal's Gandhi: the Last Phase, vol 10, part 2, pp 79-80.
Also see:
Sris Chandra Chattopadhya on the Objectives Resolution, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 1949
Communist Party of India Report (1950) - Imperialist aggression in Kashmir
CPI's Dhanwantri report: Bleeding Punjab Warns
Pakistan's Law Minister, Jogendra Nath Mandal's Resignation Letter, October 1950
Remembering Gehal Singh, who gave his life for communal harmony
Communist Party of India Report (1950) - Imperialist aggression in Kashmir
CPI's Dhanwantri report: Bleeding Punjab Warns
Pakistan's Law Minister, Jogendra Nath Mandal's Resignation Letter, October 1950
Remembering Gehal Singh, who gave his life for communal harmony
1948: Assassination of Gandhi
The Abolition of truth: on the Parivar's celebration of Godse
सत्य की हत्या
The Abolition of truth: on the Parivar's celebration of Godse
सत्य की हत्या
