RETHINKING SECULARISM
RETHINKING SECULARISM
by Bhagwan Josh, Dilip Simeon, and Purushottam Agrawal
(published in Mainstream, December 30, 1990).
NB - This article was published 23 years ago, but is probably unread today. It was written in the period immediately following Advani's failed Rath Yatra, and the BJP's withdrawal of support to VP Singh's government in late October. It was also the time of the unrest following the implementation of the Mandal commission recommendations in August 1990. Readers may judge for themselves whether the analysis of the crisis of the Indian Union presented here is still relevant - DS
1/. Symptoms of Breakdown.
The all‑round crisis of the Indian polity, with its many
social, economic and political aspects, has finally burst into the open. Today,
many people are challenging the Constitution and the way in which this has been
operated over the past decades. There is an insurgent situation prevailing in Kashmir
and Assam and
the North‑East in general. In Punjab , the Khalistani movement
has succeeded in pressurising even the Central Government. In central India
and the Gangetic plain, the RSS/BJP/VHP have unleashed unprecedented violence
against the Indian Muslims, and launched a tirade against what they call
"pseudo‑secularism". In the process the state machinery has become
increasingly subject to communal/ethnic/regional sentiments and rendered
ineffective. The Indian Army has taken on what is now accepted as a stable role
in policing Indian society. Today, what is at stake is not the future of this
or that government, but the concept of a united India ,
and the very political structure known as the Indian Union .
Why is there so much ethnic and communal unrest and
dissatisfaction with the concept of India ?
Part of the reason lies in the inheritance of a fragment of the colonial
empire, without restructuring the concept of the Nation. In fact, the first
expression of this failure was Partition. The national leadership, while
articulating popular grievances and awakening social‑democratic aspirations,
nevertheless remained elitist, constrained both by class/caste interests and the highly limited franchise permitted by
the colonial rulers. It sought to manipulate communalism (of all varieties) instead
of combatting it, failed to infuse political radicalism with far‑reaching
social reform, and capitulated to an undemocratic partition, that illusory
solution to very genuine problems. Thereafter it framed a republican
constitution incorporating democratic norms and secular‑liberal notions of
citizenship, judicial administration, and social equity. And the Indian state,
under Congress control embarked upon a path of industrialisation which it
called "socialistic".
But the pattern of "modernisation" turned out
uneven and socially discriminatory. Regional imbalances and the inequities of
status were retained and accentuated. Entire regions and zones such as the
North‑East, Jharkhand, tribal areas in Central India ,
and J & K were left underdeveloped, even while being exploited to the full
for the ruling elites. Overcentralisation has created a situation where the
pursuit of state power at the centre becomes ruthless ‑ this encourages the
development of authoritarian and violent brands of politics such as
communalism. It also becomes both the cause for and result of an erosion of
democratic functioning within the hegemonic party ‑ such has been the history
of the Congress. Thus dictatorial parties and persons could equate their own
interests with the interests of the nation.
Behind the mask of liberal individualism and citizenship,
traditionally oppressed castes/communities, and women in general, were denied
adequate representation in the affairs of state administration. Untouchability
was formally abolished in the Constitution, but the law banning the practice of
it was enacted only 8 years after Independence ,
and honoured more in the breach. The promise of reservations gave much‑needed
legitimacy to the state, but governments failed to provide the educational and
other facilities required to make such action effective. (The three‑quarters of
the population comprising the SC/ST's and OBC's possess only 11% representation
in the Class I services of the country. This despite the constitutional
provision for 22.5% reservation for just SC/ST's alone.)
2/. Pseudo‑Nationalism.
In the hands of the Congress the Constitution became an
instrument for the pursuit of class/caste interests. Political and economic
decentralisation, an ideal dear to Gandhiji's heart, and important not as a
matter of administrative convenience, but as a prerequisite for the harmonious
distribution of political and economic power, was ignored in the interests of
"savarna" capitalism. (It is significant that the share in trade and
commerce of the upper castes is 97%, whereas the remaining 3 % of business is
held by 85 % of the population. There are no Muslim owners among the top 50
business houses in the country.) Nationalism became an slogan used for the
reinforcement of the privileges of the ruling elites, including big business,
landlords, rich peasants, and their political representatives. Any attempt at
articulating local grievances against the undemocratic polity hence came to be
crushed in the name of the "Nation".
The caste consciousness and
communalism of the upper castes could easily masquerade as
"nationalism", but the resistance of the oppressed was dubbed
"casteism" and anti‑nationalism. The last Congress government
repeatedly referred to the Jharkhand and Gorkhaland movements as "anti‑national".
As per its convenience, the "High Command" tarred the leadership of
the J & K National Conference and the Akalis with the same brush.
Today we have a situation where the government fails to
protect citizens lives, but questions their patriotism if they appeal to
international sentiment; in which, six years after the single worst communal
carnage since 1947, the instigators of the violence receive open political and
state protection. This blatant contempt for law and the basic norms of justice
has had profoundly negative repercussions for the credibility of the Union of
India in the Punjab .) Multi‑ nationals like Union
Carbide can shamelessly manipulate the state‑ machine to evade their criminal
liabilities, but their victims are tortured with neglect and harrassment by
their own government. We are also witness to the most blatant extra‑constitutional
intervention since Independence , of
big business in national politics, with gigantic sums of money being used for
the purchase of MP's and the RSS/BJP/VHP campaign for the destruction of Babri
Masjid. Clearly, a significant section of the ruling classes has decided that
democracy is no longer convenient for the perpetuation of their vested
interests.
3/. The need for Secular Nationalism.
Thus, the experience of our past was building up to the
current explosion. Legitimate dissatisfaction with the patterns of development
and the collapse of civic and judicial administration have been channelised
into the politics of secessionism and communalism, and, in certain cases, a
mixture of the two. The fate of independent India
as an entity has hitherto depended, and still depends, upon a secular and
democratic nationalism, a popular consensus with the content and orientation of
balance, harmony and social justice. Such a consensus existed (in potentio) for
four long decades. The majority of the long‑ suffering masses were prepared to
wait for the realisation of these ideals, as long as they had faith in a
democratic state which could act as an instrument of their aspirations. This is
the reason why populist slogans such as "Garibi hatao" could give the
Congress such powerful support.
The need for secular nationalism was linked to the need both
to harmonise the five main religious traditions ‑ Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism,
Christianity and (Neo) Buddhism, as well as recognise and realise the egalitarian aspirations of
the hitherto oppressed castes, ethnic groups, and Indian women as a whole. In
part, this implied a democratic (as opposed to an authoritarian) reform and
rejuvenation of Hinduism, and all the above religious traditions, a cultural
revolution which could transform their intensely hierarchical sensibility into
a new, philosophical acceptance of the modern concept of human equality. But
the Congress and the elite intelligentsia (with a few noteworthy exceptions)
failed to launch any attempt towards such a renewal of Indian society and
civilisation. It further confused the situation by adding the label of
"socialism" to the Constitution during the Emergency.
4/. The Violation of the Consensus.
The continued and ruthless violation of the national
consensus, has, after a long period of unrest among the socially and
politically marginalised citizens, finally created a crisis for the Indian
state as a whole. All these years, an overcentralised polity and the domination
of ruling classes, castes and regions ‑ (the Centre over the states, the North
over the South and North‑East, the upper‑castes over the SC/ST's, backward
classes and minorities; the capitalists, landlords and rich peasants over the
working masses; and patriarchal culture over women) has operated through
unwritten codes, with the written and overtly liberal constitution functioning
as the facade of these unwritten codes.
The practice of secularism, instead of being expressed as a
creative dialogue between religious traditions, degenerated into the granting
of concessions to competing
communalisms. Now, since the Indian
State Indian Republic
5/. Understanding communalism.
Today, questions about secularism and communalism have to be
set within this context. Thus, if communalism is seen, not as an arithmetical
total of Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communalisms but as a political expression of
an authoritarian and patriarchical culture, then several seemingly paradoxical
phenomena, inherent in the communalist expression of social and psychic
frustration become explicable. It is not accidental that despite their apparent
mutual contradictions, all brands of communalism share a highly oppressive
attitude towards women. Similarly the glorification of violence and cults of
martyrdom, which are expressions of the same culture, can also bear functional
and psychological utility for the politics of resistance to both real and
perceived oppression. Thus, a continued trampling upon the basic civic rights
of minorities can only strengthen the communal patriarchs and elite castes
within such communities, as has obviously happened in the case of Indian
Muslims.
Conversely an exclusively patriarchal content to nationalism
will inevitably render it oppressive and communal. (Given the cultural and
ethnic demography of India ,
it also becomes understandable that Hindu communalism can masquerade as
hegemonic nationalism). In addition, communalism gives illegitimate power to
the more intolerant and conservative among religious leaders, raising them to
the level of "natural representatives", not democratically
responsible. This inherently militates against political democracy. In sum,
communalism is the very antithesis of a democratic culture, and its habitual
paranoia about the "Other" community is an externalisation of the
latent fear of "its own" women and oppressed "lower"
strata.
6/. Indian secularism.
The Indian version of secularism signified the peaceful co‑
existence of religious communities and a creative interaction between various
traditions. It did not imply state atheism, or an active opposition to
religion, or even a ban on the public display of religious sentiment, (as long
as this was non‑ aggressive). It is this positive connotation of Indian
secularism which has been systematically destroyed by the violent and despotic
cults of all the communalists. And it is this connotation alone which must be
reconstructed and evolved further in order to understand and deal with the
religious aspect of disrupted social and political relations in the current
crisis. Any notion of secularism for which religion is a purely private affair
of the individual fails to comprehend that religion plays an important role as
a source of ethical inspiration and in the creation of social identities.
How is this possible? To begin with, it is necessary to
recognise that the peoples of the Indian subcontinent carry with them not single,
but multifarious and overlapping identities. These include identities of caste,
region, dialect, gender,and community. Whereas gender is natural (although
gender oppression is certainly not), the rest are historically created, with
varying lineages. The categories of the "Nation"; of monolithically
defined communities; caste‑federations or estates; and class‑alliances and
class organisations originated in the late colonial period and carried
political functions within the context of a retreating imperialism.
Sometimes
these identities conflict with each other, pulling groups and individuals in
different directions : thus, women as oppressed gender and women as members of
this or that patriarchically defined caste or community; Muslims as Pakistanis
versus Muslims as Bengalis; Assamese as caste‑Hindus and as inhabitants of an
underdeveloped region; Neo‑Buddhists as self‑consciously rejuvenated citizens
versus Neo‑Buddhists as "scheduled" castes; &c
Upon the older, pre‑colonial matrix of identities were
superimposed two new sets of identities. One was linked to the language of the
colonial administration, coloured both by its motivations and inadequate
comprehension of Indian culture. The British also introduced enumerative
categories through the censuses, something which profoundly influenced the self‑consciousness
of the Indian intelligentsia. The second set of identities was also a product
of the colonial churning of Indian society. They included the Nation, the
community and the caste‑blocs, and became political forms of expression of the
popular striving for change. Because of wide disparities in wealth, education
and opportunity, these structures came to be dominated by an elite
intelligentsia, often mobile as leaders within different categories.
But the different categories had an uneasy co‑existence,
because not all social and political elites had a desire for democratic
renewal. Hence the construction of monolithic "communities" became
the political project of the more conservative elements within the different
religious traditions, and their version of religion was more of a political‑cultural
project, quite at variance with the older, folk traditions. The communal
sensibility influenced the broader nationalist consciousness, particularly
because of the dominant social position of communal leaders and the restricted
franchise. (This gave exclusive political privileges to the castes/classes to
which these leaders belonged.)
The national movement proved unequal to the task of blunting
the reactionary politics of the upper‑caste and feudal/usurious elements. For
these groups a democratic consensus within a republican constitution which gave
the oppressed even a glimmer of hope for a social democracy, was unacceptable.
They floated alternative, exclusivist concepts of nationhood, such as
"Hindu Rashtra" and the "Two‑Nation Theory", to try and co‑opt
popular aspirations. The undemocratic Partition strengthened the reactionary
elements on both sides of a nation divided into two states. Whereas the direct
control by Muslim communalists over state‑power in Pakistan
led to a rapid slide towards autocracy, in India
the struggle between the conflicting social‑democratic and authoritarian
traditions of nationalism was more prolonged.
Conclusion.
This struggle has been going on in India ,
both within and sometimes outside the plane of the Constitution for the past
four decades. The struggle for equality and democratic functioning has lain
at the core of the conflict between the
"upper" and "lower" caste‑blocs; the central government and
the state governments; the backward regions and the state as a whole; between
city and country; women and the patriarchal structure of society and polity;
rich and poor, etc. The current political turmoil is but the latest (and most
serious) expression of the critical stage that the struggle has reached. If it
is not recognised explicitly even now, no amount of state militarism (or Hindu
communalism) can prevent the breakup of the country. Therefore, the positive
aspects of the nationalist platform have to be resurrected and made the basis
of a renewal of democratic commitment by the people towards their own future.
Thus, tensions about identities in India
are expressed through various different codes. It is necessary to strive for an
alignment of those codes which express the social‑democratic aspirations of the
oppressed factor in our society, and isolate those codes which lead to more
violence and authoritarian politics. As a starting point, a consensus may be
notionally accepted which will include the basic values of non‑violence,
women's liberation, the end of caste oppression, democratic practices, and the
freedom of the individual. Any consensus which violates these values will
negate the concept of democratic secular nationalism, which is the only
possible basis for the continued existence of the Union of India. An acceptance
of this concept will, on the other hand, help heal the religious divide,
because the values we have outlined are just as much contained within religious
traditions as are their negative features. Our current experience of perverse
religiousity owes much to the products of patriarchy, communalism violence, and
a euro‑centric understanding of secularism. This consensus can hold India
together, and begin the long and painful process of healing the wounds
inflicted on society by the decades of "savarna" capitalist rule.
(A) The federal nature of the Indian polity must be re‑iterated,
with a promise made to restructure the balance of power between centre and states
within a specified time period. The aspirations of backward regions must be
addressed.
(B) The legitimate aspirations of ethnic and religious
identities must be recognised, on the ground of the above mentioned non‑aggressive
consensus. This redressal too, must be time‑bound.
(C) The question of women's equality, embodied in concrete
legal and constitutional norms, should be placed at the centre of a debate on
secularism, so as to construct a new cultural basis for Indian nationhood.
(D) The prolonged quest for social equality, justice and
redressal of grievances by victims of communal/caste violence; and by the
victims of environmental‑industrial oppression must meet with the promise of
realisation, again, within the foreseeable future.
The four items of this agenda should form the pillars of
national, secular renewal as the basis of India 's
democratic republic.
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