The limits of Putin’s power

Putin’s hardline policy towards the opposition is turning out to be counterproductive.


July seems a good time to draw some conclusions about the current political season and attempt a forecast of the one to come. If I were to sum it up in one sentence, I would say that the culmination of ‘Operation Caretaker’, as planned four years ago, was not a success. Formally, Putin has returned to the Kremlin, but without the mandate he enjoyed in his previous term as president. He is, however, intent on ruling as if his support was as strong as before, and this is the main factor behind Russia’s unrolling political crisis. The crisis has not yet reached its acute phase. The situation is reminiscent of the moment when an illness might still be taken for a slight indisposition, but the number of white blood cells is already indicating something more serious. The patient, meanwhile, misled by the mildness of his symptoms, is trying to carry on as usual. Let’s take a look at the symptoms of this crisis, basing our analysis on more or less objective data and facts.

Popularity vs. oil: The first of these is a steady decline in Putin’s popularity among Russians. During the 2008-2009 crisis, Putin’s ‘approval balance’ (the gap between the ‘approves’ and ‘disapproves’, according to Levada Centre figures) predictably fell from a maximum of 78 points to 55 (April 2009). It then rose again and steadied at around 60 points. But another steep slide began at the start of 2011: by March Putin had a 40 point balance, and a second slide occurred at the end of the summer, ending up at 27 points in December. In other words, in the course of a year the balance fell by 50%. And after a slight pre-election peak at the start of 2012, the figure dropped once more to 30% by June...

The new assault on the media; legislation, full of Stalinist rhetoric, against demonstrators and NGOs; preparations for a major political trial of opposition figures à la Lukashenko after the events of 6th May – all this comes under the heading of ‘reaction’. Functionally, ‘reaction’ is a normal phase of a political crisis related to the gradual loss of a regime’s legitimacy. Obvious signs of weakness in a regime create grounds for a split in the ranks of the elite – support for the regime ceases to be a sure-fire bet. ‘Reaction’ is the response of a regime that needs to demonstrate to its elites its strength and total control of the apparatus of repression. But ‘reaction’ is a big risk. If it is insufficiently convincing, it will only nurture unrest and panic amongst the elites. And both too little and too much use of force can have an equally negative effect.
In the first place, the elite is likely to have an ambivalent attitude to a ‘hard line’ Kremlin offensive. One notable event of the last few days was the news that United Russia MPs were forced to put their individual signatures to the Stalinist anti-NGO bill. It seems that such demonstrations of a ‘hard line’ caused some panic even in Putin’s supposed front line troops...
http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/kirill-rogov/limits-of-putin%E2%80%99s-power

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