Lokpal a short cut that will not work: Amitabha Pande
There exists an astonishing perversity of consensus about the desirability of Lokpal. Everyone seems to think that having one is critical to the crusade against corruption. Will the Lokpal make even an iota of difference to the diversity of rent seeking avenues? Will it transform decision making processes and make decision makers more democratically accountable?
Is greater centralisation of authority in a public official and the creation of a whole new bureaucracy an answer to problems created by bureaucratic centralisation? The answer to all these questions is an overwhelming 'No'. Why then persist with a proposal which will only open yet another rent seeking opportunity? The proposal deserves to be summarily jettisoned.
Why? For one, a prescription made without knowing what the disease is, or after defining it in simplistic terms can lead to fatal after effects. Let's face it, even when we talk of 'financial' corruption, we are referring to a bewildering variety of wrongdoings - rent seeking, cronyism, misuse of authority for personal gain, embezzlement of public funds, patronage and favouritism. Each of these requires to be treated very differently and rarely, if at all, through a cure-all prescription like the Lokpal. The Lokpal votaries have not attempted a diagnosis and yet offer a universal prescription with the smugness of a self righteous quack..
... as the engine as well as the driver of the economy, (the India state) positions itself in a perfect situation to become a super rentier. Corruption is therefore embedded in the basic framework of the system.
The second factor is the structure of Indian democracy, heavily centralised, in which the legislature plays a secondary role to the executive and federated units and local governments get subordinated especially in the financial decision making sphere. Their primary role becomes something like that of a franchisee who operates the rent seeking business for the parent company on a revenue share model. The power to say 'no' is completely decentralised, so that everyone can block unless paid their share of rent, and the power to say 'yes' extremely centralised so that at the apex the highest share of the rent can be collected.
The proponents of the Lokpal Bill show complete ignorance of these systemic flaws and accept the structure of decision making as it is. One of the biggest flaws in such thinking is the premise that the fear of getting caught keeps a check on corrupt behaviour. In fact, it is well established that policing and crime often develop a cosy relationship and a vested interest develops in keeping crime alive to sustain an expansionary police, especially if crime acquires a strong financial dimension. Such instances will grow exponentially with a super powerful agency like the Lokpal and the removal of existing safeguards which offer a modicum of protection to the honest.
For the dishonest the deterrent value of a powerful Lokpal is very little. It only means that he has to work out more ingenious ways of escaping detection. Vigil keepers invariably look for deviation from procedure, forgetting that most of the really corrupt are clever enough to be meticulous in their paperwork. Paradoxically, higher the level of procedural correctness required, higher the chances of the bidders having to pay more for a smooth passage. For the rent collectors along the approval chain, it is not necessary to deviate from procedure or to influence the purchase decision in favour of any bidder...
There are no short cuts to tackling corruption. The State has to be made to reduce the sphere of its activities and devolve most of its powers and resources to the smallest feasible unit of democratic governance. Decision making has to involve the participation of the maximum number of people and there has to be a concerted effort to move from bureaucratic to democratic processes. Budgets, as instruments of control have to replace administrative hierarchy based controls with clearly designated responsibilities to 'Budget Holders' for achieving budgeted outcomes. Internal delegation of powers has to follow the principle of 'maximum possible' rather than 'minimum necessary'.
The grand crusade against corruption has, instead of mobilising popular support for a transformation of governance has reduced itself to a campaign for centralised controls and a further diminution of the institutions of democracy. What we need is more democracy, not less.
