Are Iran’s protests Economic or Political? By Juan Cole
The rallies certainly began as protests against inflation and joblessness. Iran’s economy is set to grow 4% this year, but inflation is at 9%, which means that Iranians will get 5% poorer. Moreover, the clerical ruling class will be held harmless from that decline in real purchasing power. The four percent growth is mainly because of increased petroleum sales now that international sanctions have been lifted, and because oil prices have firmed up to $60 a barrel. The petroleum proceeds go straight to the government, i.e. to the ruling clerics, who head up a range of foundations and businesses that get government subsidies.
Iran's enemies to blame for unrest, says supreme leader
Borzou Daragahi has argued that in a bid to be more transparent, President Hassan Rouhani released budget numbers recently that revealed the extent of government support for clerical foundations, angering workers who not only do not get subsidies but who are going to see their real purchasing power drop 5% again this year. It also appears that the protests began last Thursday with support from hard liners who were hoping to embarrass President Rouhani. The latter had put a lot of political capital behind the nuclear deal with the Security Council, on the grounds that it would end sanctions and improve the economic situation, which had become dire under Obama’s severe sanctions. The joke turned out to be on the hard liners, who started a wave of protests but lost control of them, with crowds chanting not just death to Rouhani (what the hard liners were going for) but death to Khamenei and death to the Revolutionary Guards (the very institutions the hard liners wanted to strengthen).
So for instance, Iranian Labour News Agency reported (via BBC Monitoring) that 80 people were arrested in the central city of Arak for attempting to invade government offices yesterday. So why were they doing that? It isn’t clear. But it could be that they were hoping to capture municipal records showing corruption. A crowd in Tehran broke into a municipal building, according to Afsaran.ir. Although you could say that invading government offices is a political and not a religious act, in fact it would be hard to separate them out.
In Tehran, some 200 protesters have been arrested and at on point this weekend they attempted to march on the private residence of Aytatollah Ali Khamenei, the clerical leader of the country. That march was political, but they may have been making economic demands. The killings (two dead in Dorud in Lorestan) and jailings of hundreds have themselves become reasons for people to come out to demonstrate. The demonstrations create martyrs, in whose name more demonstrations are held.
President Rouhani took revenge on the hard liners by giving a speech in which he upheld the right of Iranians to demonstrate. He did draw the line at sabotage, however.
One problem with the debate between Abrams and Thomas Erdbrink of the NYT is that separating out economic and political discontents is not easy, especially in Iran, where the government (as in most petro-states) owns some 80% of the economy. I think we may conclude that some voices in some of the protests have begun speaking of overthrowing the government, and the question for many protesters no longer seems to be high priced food but rather the clerical regime itself.
Iran's enemies to blame for unrest, says supreme leader
So for instance, Iranian Labour News Agency reported (via BBC Monitoring) that 80 people were arrested in the central city of Arak for attempting to invade government offices yesterday. So why were they doing that? It isn’t clear. But it could be that they were hoping to capture municipal records showing corruption. A crowd in Tehran broke into a municipal building, according to Afsaran.ir. Although you could say that invading government offices is a political and not a religious act, in fact it would be hard to separate them out.
In Tehran, some 200 protesters have been arrested and at on point this weekend they attempted to march on the private residence of Aytatollah Ali Khamenei, the clerical leader of the country. That march was political, but they may have been making economic demands. The killings (two dead in Dorud in Lorestan) and jailings of hundreds have themselves become reasons for people to come out to demonstrate. The demonstrations create martyrs, in whose name more demonstrations are held.
President Rouhani took revenge on the hard liners by giving a speech in which he upheld the right of Iranians to demonstrate. He did draw the line at sabotage, however.
One problem with the debate between Abrams and Thomas Erdbrink of the NYT is that separating out economic and political discontents is not easy, especially in Iran, where the government (as in most petro-states) owns some 80% of the economy. I think we may conclude that some voices in some of the protests have begun speaking of overthrowing the government, and the question for many protesters no longer seems to be high priced food but rather the clerical regime itself.
See also
Foucault and Iran: http://newpol.org/content/revi
Nouvel Observateur published, in its November 6 issue, excerpts of a letter from the pseudonymous "Atoussa H.," a leftist Iranian woman living in exile in France, who took strong exception to Foucault's uncritical stance toward the Islamists. She declared: "I am very distressed by the matter of fact commentaries usually made by the French left with respect to the prospect of an ‘Islamic' government replacing the bloody tyranny of the shah."[2] Foucault, she wrote, seemed "deeply moved by ‘Muslim spirituality,' which, according to him, would be an improvement over the ferocious capitalist dictatorship, which is today beginning to fall apart." Why, she continued, alluding to the 1953 overthrow of the democratic and leftist Mossadeq government, must the Iranian people, "after twenty-five years of silence and oppression" be forced to choose between "the SAVAK and religious fanaticism?" Unveiled women were already being insulted on the streets and Khomeini supporters had made clear that "in the regime they want to create, women will have to adhere" to Islamic law. With respect to statements that ethnic and religious minorities would have their rights "so long as they do not harm the majority," Atoussa H. asked pointedly: "Since when have the minorities begun to ‘harm'" the majority?
Maxim Rodinson poured cold water on the hopes of many on the left for an emancipatory outcome in Iran. He pointed to specific ways in which the ideology of an Islamic state carried with it many reactionary features: "Even a minimalist Islamic fundamentalism would require, according to the Koran, that the hands of thieves be cut off and that a woman's share of the inheritance be cut in half. If there is a return to tradition, as the men of religion want, then it will be necessary to whip the wine drinker and whip or stone the adulterer…Nothing will be easier or more dangerous than this time-honored accusation: my adversary is an ‘enemy of God'." Bringing to bear the perspectives of historical materialism, he wrote: "It is astonishing, after centuries of common experience, that it is still necessary to recall one of the best attested laws of history. Good moral intentions, whether or not endorsed by the deity, are a weak basis for determining the practical policies of states." What lay in store for Iran, he worried, was not a liberation but "a semi-archaic fascism."
