G.S. Chawla - How Sabotage By Indira Gandhi’s Advisors Paved the Way for Operation Blue Star
On the eve of
the anniversary of Operation Blue Star – the army’s attack on Jarnail
Singh Bhindranwale and his heavily armed militants holed up inside the
Golden Temple in Amritsar on June 5-6, 1984 – it is
worth remembering how some leaders of the Congress party sabotaged the
attempts that were being made to resolve the deteriorating situation in Punjab.
Had they not done so, there would have been no need for military action in the
Golden Temple – and terrorism in Punjab, fuelled by the Pakistani exploitation
of Sikh sentiment, would not have spread like fire the way it did from June
1984 onwards. Indeed, the events
leading up to Blue Star are reminder of how even shrewd leaders like
Indira Gandhi can become victim of the undesirable elements around them. As I
explained in my book, Bloodshed in Punjab,
she was surrounded by undesirable elements who lead her to the path of
destruction. There were many forces working on these lines who succeeded in
their mission but caused enormous damage to the country.
First act of
sabotage: In the first week of
April 1982, Bhindranwale visited the capital on the invitation of Jathedar
Santokh Singh, who was close to Indira Gandhi and also Zail Singh, who was
president at the time. Bhindranwale was moving around the capital with
his armed supporters, who sat on the roof top of a bus with
Bhindranwale inside, and this was a very embarrassing situation for the central
government. The then home secretary, T.N. Chaturvedi and Lt. Governor of Delhi,
S.L. Khurana, felt very concerned over the situation. They were in
touch with the Intelligence Bureau director, T.V. Rajeshwar.
Khurana was planning
to have Bhindranwale arrested in Delhi itself. Chaturvedi discussed the
entire situation and its consequences with Indira Gandhi and then sent Khurana
to convince her that they would be able to face the situation. Indira
Gandhi asked him many questions – how would they handle the situation and
what would happen if Bhindranwale died in the process. Khurana told
her that Bhindranwale was always sitting inside the bus and he
would not be hurt. But even if some unfortunate situation develops, we
should face it, he said. Indira Gandhi consented and authorised the
police to arrest Bhindranwale. Unfortunately, information about this
plan leaked. Bhindranwale received a message – that he
should leave Delhi as there were plans to arrest him. Intelligence reports
of the time hinted at the leak originating from persons close to Zail
Singh. Whatever the truth, Bhindranwale immediately shifted to the Majnu
ka Tila gurudwara on the outskirts of Delhi and left the next morning for
Punjab, foiling the plan to have him arrested.
Second sabotage: The second act of
sabotage took place in November 1982. Indira Gandhi had appointed a cabinet
committee on Punjab, and she had asked Sardar Swaran Singh to persuade the
Akalis to come for talks. Swaran Singh had a reputation as
an excellent negotiator. After the Chinese aggression in 1962, talks were
started with Pakistan under US pressure. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as Pakistan’s foreign minister, was leading his country’s delegation.
Jawaharlal Nehru deputed Swaran Singh to lead the Indian delegation – and prolong
the talks as long as possible. Swaran Singh had seven rounds of
dialogue with Bhutto and after the seventh, a hassled Bhutto held a press
conference in Delhi which I also attended, and attacked the Indian delegation.
That was the end of the talks.
Whether for his
filibustering skills or his ability to actually produce a compromise, Indira
Gandhi asked Swaran Singh to take up the task of talking to Akalis who
were lodged in different jails.
The veteran
negotiator succeeded in bringing them to the table, so to speak. The
Akalis’ first agitation had failed and they were to announce their next
programme on November 4, 1982 at Amritsar. Swaran Singh had pleaded with the
cabinet committee on November 3, 1982, in Pranab Mukherjee’s room in parliament
house, that a situation should be created in which the Akalis are persuaded to
postpone their plans as once they announce any programme from the Golden
Temple, they would not be able to go back on that. He spoke to various
Akali leaders from Pranab Mukherjee’s room and a way out was found – that the
government should make a statement in parliament the next day making certain
assurances. A brief statement was prepared in which the government appreciated
the sacrifices made by the Sikhs in the freedom struggle and assured
sympathetic consideration of their demands. As for their political
demands, the government said it needed some time for consultations with other
states. The Akalis agreed to accept this statement.
A copy of the
draft was sent to Indira Gandhi. It was at this stage, late at night, that
she succumbed to pressure from Arun Nehru and M.L. Fotedar, who supported
the argument put forward by Bhajan Lal of Haryana that if this statement
was made, the Congress would lose the Haryana assembly elections which
were due in next few months. At their urging, the
statement was changed and the next day, Union home minister P.C. Sethi made a
statement on Punjab that was different from the one that had been read
out to the Akalis. I know this because I had seen a copy of the original
statement. Swaran Singh himself had come to parliament to listen to the home
minister.
After Sethi’s statement, Swaran Singh told me: “This is neither
the same statement nor the same spirit’, and I am going to withdraw from
negotiations.” So it was that on
November 4, 1982, the Akalis announced their next programme – declaring a
boycott of the Asian games, which led to a further cleavage between them and
the government. It was during this period that Bhajan Lal, who was Haryana
chief minister, played the dirtiest role and prevented the entry of Sikhs –
including high court judges and army officers – coming to Delhi. News of this
humiliation spread like a fire not only in India but in the Sikh diaspora
in the United States, Canada and many other countries and there were protests
against Indira Gandhi at many places.
There is a lesson
here which leaders must learn – that if they keep undesirable elements around
them, they will be misled completely and this will result in great
damage to the country. Between Zail Singh on one side and the Arun
Nehru-Fotedar group on the other, the people advising Indira Gandhi played
a very destructive role in exacerbating the Punjab crisis. If these
two acts of sabotage had not taken place, I am sure there would have been
no need for Operation Blue Star, and perhaps Indira Gandhi might still
have been alive.
The current Bharatiya
Janata Party-led government at the Centre and its leaders have not
learnt any lessons from the events in Punjab; my fear is that the open Hindutva
agenda of the Saffron parivar may harm the country more than the tragic events
in Punjab did three decades ago.
https://thewire.in/144020/indira-gandhi-bluestar-punjab/see also
