ANTON SHEKHOVTSOV - ‘A new (order) Ukraine’ ?
Events in Ukraine have provoked an avalanche of media comment, much of which, though well-intentioned, is not entirely accurate
Commenting on Cas Mudde’s article ‘A new (order) Ukraine? Assessing the relevance of Ukraine’s far right in an EU perspective’ is somewhat tricky. On the one hand, Mudde is one of the best experts on the European far right whose work I deeply respect and quote often in my own research. On the other hand, his article is exactly the reason why over 40 of the world’s leading specialists on the Ukrainian nationalism and extreme right have issued a statement calling ‘upon all those who have either no particular interest for, or no deeper knowledge of, Ukraine to not comment on this region’s complicated national questions without engaging in some in-depth research.’ As Mudde himself acknowledges that he is ‘not a scholar of Ukrainian nationalism’, he obviously falls into the category of academics and commentators mentioned in the statement.
Mudde claims that he did ‘some serious reading on the issues’ of the Ukrainian far right and his ‘literature review’ seems to draw – not exclusively but for the most part – upon my own works published some time ago. My recent research, however, has been largely ignored. At the same time, given the information war that Russia has waged against Ukraine to discredit its pro-democratic and pro-European revolution by claiming that ‘Ukrainian radical ultranationalists’ have seized power in the country, I cannot ignore the misconceptions in Mudde’s article. Although I obviously understand his concerns about the influence of far-right groups in my country, I believe they are not grounded in facts, as these groups do not in fact wield any real authority. I will focus on some of Mudde's claims.
‘In ideological terms Svoboda is quite similar to the other parties that it collaborates with in the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM), such as the British National Party (BNP), the German National Democratic Party (NPD), and the Italian Tricolor Flame.’
This is partly true. However, Svoboda no longer cooperates with the AENM: early in 2013 it was stripped of its observer status in the Alliance by Hungarian far right Jobbik. Svoboda opposes the Kremlin’s influence in Ukraine; Jobbik is now cooperating with Russian Eurasianists such as Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin, who is calling for the annexation of several parts of Ukraine to Russia and has recently been active in recruiting Russian ultra-nationalist militants urging them to go to Ukraine to help the Russian military invade the country. Jobbik is also against the EU and would rather have Hungary join the Russia-led Eurasian Union, the establishment of which is planned for 2015. The reason behind Jobbik’s decision to block Svoboda’s cooperation with the AENM was exactly this ideological conflict: Svoboda is pro-EU and anti-Kremlin, while Jobbik is anti-EU and pro-Kremlin. Furthermore, the German National Democratic Party has never been a member of the AENM.
‘Svoboda is not even the most extreme far right group represented in the new Ukrainian government. Pravy Sektor (Right Sector) is a coalition of mostly smaller far right groups, including various neo-fascists and neo-Nazis, which came together during the protests.’
While the Right Sector has indeed a neo-Nazi fringe – constituted by the representatives from the ‘White Hammer’ group, ‘Patriot of Ukraine’, Social-National Assembly – the main group behind the Right Sector is ‘Tryzub’ (Trident) which is far from neo-Nazism, racism and anti-Semitism. Its ideology can be interpreted as national conservative. Furthermore, nobody from the Right Sector is represented in the new Ukrainian government...
read more:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/anton-shekhovtsov/response-to-cas-mudde%E2%80%99s-Ukraine-Far-RIght-How-Real-Russia
Commenting on Cas Mudde’s article ‘A new (order) Ukraine? Assessing the relevance of Ukraine’s far right in an EU perspective’ is somewhat tricky. On the one hand, Mudde is one of the best experts on the European far right whose work I deeply respect and quote often in my own research. On the other hand, his article is exactly the reason why over 40 of the world’s leading specialists on the Ukrainian nationalism and extreme right have issued a statement calling ‘upon all those who have either no particular interest for, or no deeper knowledge of, Ukraine to not comment on this region’s complicated national questions without engaging in some in-depth research.’ As Mudde himself acknowledges that he is ‘not a scholar of Ukrainian nationalism’, he obviously falls into the category of academics and commentators mentioned in the statement.
Mudde claims that he did ‘some serious reading on the issues’ of the Ukrainian far right and his ‘literature review’ seems to draw – not exclusively but for the most part – upon my own works published some time ago. My recent research, however, has been largely ignored. At the same time, given the information war that Russia has waged against Ukraine to discredit its pro-democratic and pro-European revolution by claiming that ‘Ukrainian radical ultranationalists’ have seized power in the country, I cannot ignore the misconceptions in Mudde’s article. Although I obviously understand his concerns about the influence of far-right groups in my country, I believe they are not grounded in facts, as these groups do not in fact wield any real authority. I will focus on some of Mudde's claims.
‘In ideological terms Svoboda is quite similar to the other parties that it collaborates with in the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM), such as the British National Party (BNP), the German National Democratic Party (NPD), and the Italian Tricolor Flame.’
This is partly true. However, Svoboda no longer cooperates with the AENM: early in 2013 it was stripped of its observer status in the Alliance by Hungarian far right Jobbik. Svoboda opposes the Kremlin’s influence in Ukraine; Jobbik is now cooperating with Russian Eurasianists such as Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin, who is calling for the annexation of several parts of Ukraine to Russia and has recently been active in recruiting Russian ultra-nationalist militants urging them to go to Ukraine to help the Russian military invade the country. Jobbik is also against the EU and would rather have Hungary join the Russia-led Eurasian Union, the establishment of which is planned for 2015. The reason behind Jobbik’s decision to block Svoboda’s cooperation with the AENM was exactly this ideological conflict: Svoboda is pro-EU and anti-Kremlin, while Jobbik is anti-EU and pro-Kremlin. Furthermore, the German National Democratic Party has never been a member of the AENM.
‘Svoboda is not even the most extreme far right group represented in the new Ukrainian government. Pravy Sektor (Right Sector) is a coalition of mostly smaller far right groups, including various neo-fascists and neo-Nazis, which came together during the protests.’
While the Right Sector has indeed a neo-Nazi fringe – constituted by the representatives from the ‘White Hammer’ group, ‘Patriot of Ukraine’, Social-National Assembly – the main group behind the Right Sector is ‘Tryzub’ (Trident) which is far from neo-Nazism, racism and anti-Semitism. Its ideology can be interpreted as national conservative. Furthermore, nobody from the Right Sector is represented in the new Ukrainian government...
read more:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/anton-shekhovtsov/response-to-cas-mudde%E2%80%99s-Ukraine-Far-RIght-How-Real-Russia
