JYOTIRMAYA SHARMA - The History and Future of a Demolition Without End. Babri Masjid, December 6, 1992
The destruction of the Babri Masjid was an act long in the
making and the processes it involved are still very much with us
The destruction of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 was
not merely an instance of state-sponsored lawlessness. Neither was it a
momentary lapse in the enforcement of rule of law. While it is seen by many as
just an episode or a trigger that unleashed forces of Hindu religious nationalism,
it was, in fact, the culmination of a process that began in the 19th century.
European modernity, orientalism, ideas of reform, restatements of society and
religion were the ingredients that went into the making of an Indian
nationalism in that century. It was just that: one idea of India rather than
many ideas of India.
Out of a dazzling constellation of sects, doctrines,
philosophical arguments, rites, rituals, practices, social realities,
identities and differences, a unique entity called Hinduism was confected. Its
central purpose was to be compatible and commensurate with the idea of
sovereignty and the state.
In order to exist and to be legitimate, this version of
Hinduism depended on certain affirmations. The first was its own centrality as
religion and its salience as the core of national identity. In being so, it had
to be modern, scientific and rational. Affirmation of caste was the second
element. It resurrected the ideal of the cerebral brahmin as the repository of
culture and tradition.
But it also celebrated the ideal of the kshatriya as the
embodiment of force, violence and masculinity in the service of maintaining
order, stability, and justice. The kshatriya was no longer just the dispenser
of punishment, waging just war: he held independent charge of the instruments
of violence and retributive justice. Early Indologists and orientalists
contributed to this effort. Texts and scriptures were often quoted out of
context in the belief that texts scientifically and empirically reflected the social
and historical reality in India.
The mild Hindu, the Muslim zealot: A third element in constructing the Hindu self-image appears
at first to be a contradiction of the previous two elements, but was, indeed, a
legitimising device for the new Hinduism that was taking shape. This was the
myth of the mild, peaceful, soft, otherworldly, non-materialistic, tolerant,
and all-embracing Hindu.
In constructing this shared myth, two processes were at
play. A subtle internalisation of the caricature of Muslim identity was the
first of these elements. From the 18th century onwards, the
caricature of Muslims portrayed them as religious zealots, with the Qur’an in
one hand and sword in the other, exhibiting a fierce theocratic unity and
religious fervour, but, more importantly, as a people ready to die for their
religion and nation. Nineteenth century restatements of Hinduism were bewitched
and mesmerised by their own caricature of the Muslim. This view has had an
unusual longevity; hence in its 20th century formulation, it
could still impel V.D. Savarkar to exult that this religious unity and fervour
made the Muslims ‘irresistible’.
While part of this caricature was absorbed for
the sake of fabricating the ‘new’ Hinduism, the Muslim also had to be
distanced. Temple destruction was one such element that went into the process
of demonising the Muslims. Despite this, another view of the Muslims as
sensuous, lascivious, indolent – Bankim’s bearded, opium-eating degenerates –
existed side by side and was used when convenient, often in conjunction with
the first (as in the modern Hindutva myth of ‘love jihad’ and its earlier
variants)
The shared myth of the mild, soft, peaceful, reasonable and
tolerant Hindu also helps in escaping any serious discussion of the excesses of
caste. While many nationalist thinkers expressed pious sentiments regarding the
plight of the Dalits, they did little to alter the primacy of the upper castes
or the social structures that supported caste oppression. Symbolic gestures
were offered periodically but every single one of these were geared towards
bringing about a preconceived, elite-driven Hindu unity for the sake of the
nation. Not only did the shared myth help in muting any serious discussion of
caste, but it also attempted to whitewash violent and invective-ridden
antagonisms between Hindu religious sects.
Casting aside the shackles of citizenship
Indian nationalism and the modern Indian state were crafted
out of these affirmations. In a deft and effortless move, the word ‘Indian’
replaced the word ’Hindu’. After 1947, while Indians were formally citizens
governed by a constitution, there was an unspoken understanding among many
(within both the Congress and the sangh parivar) that ‘we’ were governed by a
pre-political and pre-social unity that transcended the Constitution and the
rule of law. The conflict with democracy and its institutions dates back to 1947
and is not something that is a recent development. This is how the conflict
unfolded.
Democracy and its institutions sought to convert the shared
myths of the Hindus into reality. It was no longer a question of self-image or
self-identity. The concept of citizenship meant the Hindu had to be mild, soft,
reasonable and tolerant and submit to the rule of law. The cerebral brahmin had
to admit to other versions of tradition and culture. The kshatriya could no
longer possess the instruments of violence, punishment and retributive justice.
The Constitution spoke of equality before law, unmindful of caste, class,
gender or religion. This inaugurated a slow but steady distrust in the
institutions of democracy while retaining a ritualistic faith in elections as a
means of conferring legitimacy on the central tenets of the shared myth. The
demolition of the Babri Masjid was the unshackling of this impulse and an
attempt to reappropriate the instruments of violence.
The Mandal movement went a long way towards disturbing
this pre-political and pre-social consensus. The Dalits, more than any other
section of Indian society, have a greater stake in the promises and hopes the
Indian Constitution offers. It offers, above all, radical equality, if only on
paper. The various ‘Backward Class’ and Dalit movements – and their growing
resurgence – also give a lie to the myth of Hindu unity and a
chimerical Hindu vote bank.
The elections of 2014 and the emergence of a BJP majority in
Parliament has only consolidated the process that started in the 19th century.
While there is much to cheer from the election results in Bihar, three major
trends have emerged from 2014.
The good days roll: There is, firstly, a move to ensure that the ‘nation’ takes
over the state. The ’nation’ is often defined in terms of numbers, but also
tradition and culture. The simple formula is that whoever wins a majority in
parliament represents the ’nation’ – the mandate, in other words, is the
’nation’. This ’nation’ is arbitrary, wilful, intolerant and aggressive. It is
above principles and legal niceties.
The second trend is of greater significance. It lies in the
realisation that not only Hindutva but the 19th century version
of Hinduism can only exist with the help of the state. For the mild, soft,
tolerant, reasonable and peaceful Hindu to survive, the state has to ensure
that differences be eliminated in the name of unity, that plurality be
eliminated in the name of the survival of a scientific and rational Hinduism.
The enemies of this state-supported Hinduism could be the folk and the tribal
traditions, the Dalits, the Muslims and all forms of free expression.
Given the contestations within the democratic framework,
where elections can be lost on grounds of mis-governance and non-governance, a
neutral space for the ’new’ Hinduism to survive had to be found. This space had
to be modern, technologically savvy, and scientific. But it also had to divorce
governance from its details, reducible to technocratic and managerial
solutions. The exhortation is to look at the larger picture, one that
invariably excludes the poor, and involves atrocities on Dalits, women and
minorities. It is a space that systematically represses alternative views,
dissent and ideology, branding them dirty and manufactured. Politics itself had
to be neutralised: it has to be reduced to throwing up a majority in the
service of order and stability. The public space is to be sanitised from all enemies
of stability and order, even if they are Indian citizens: they have choices now
of either going to Pakistan or being branded terrorists or anti-national.
This neutral space is the zone of progress and ‘vikas’, or
development. It envelops the traditional upper castes, and also upper
classes and corporates. But its formal logic and appeal also includes farmers,
Dalits, women and minorities. It is today’s version of the 19th century
ideal of making Hindu men more manly. Married to the rhetoric of nationalism,
progress and development is all about the physical and economic muscle of the
’nation’. Here, GDP figures replace principles and basic freedoms. The ideal of
India as an economic superpower, encashing its quiet, supine, uncomplaining,
orderly and disciplined demographic dividend is the 21st century culmination of
the myth of the mild, soft, reasonable, peaceful, otherworldly and
non-materialistic Hindu. In the 19th century, this myth was
created to serve the demands of sovereignty and the state. It fares no better
in our century.
see also
RSS Declared
Unlawful: Text of GOI communique February 4, 1948
Smruti Koppikar - Maharashtra CM has no will to pursue my father’s murder
Petition in Supreme Court Accuses NIA of Soft-Pedaling Hindutva Terror Cases
After Malegaon, Ajmer Blast Case Faces Allegations of Sabotage // Witnesses turn hostile in Samjhauta case
The law of killing: a brief history of Indian fascism
Smruti Koppikar - Maharashtra CM has no will to pursue my father’s murder
Petition in Supreme Court Accuses NIA of Soft-Pedaling Hindutva Terror Cases
After Malegaon, Ajmer Blast Case Faces Allegations of Sabotage // Witnesses turn hostile in Samjhauta case
The law of killing: a brief history of Indian fascism
The Broken
Middle - my essay on the 30th anniversary of 1984
The Assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: Inquiry Commission Report (1969)
The Abolition of truth
RSS tradition of manufacturing facts to suit their ideology
The Assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: Inquiry Commission Report (1969)
The Abolition of truth
RSS tradition of manufacturing facts to suit their ideology
