PAUL ROGERS - Iran, hopes and fears
The potential rapprochment between Washington and Tehran could become part of a wider realignment that allows progress in ending Syria's war.
The tentative six-month deal between Iran and the "P5+1" states may be the start of a serious improvement in United States-Iranian relations or it could come rapidly unstuck. The deal itself is certainly significant politically but is also interesting from a technical point of view, meeting head on some of the major problems that have held back progress over Iran's nuclear programme.
Since February 2010, Iran has been slowly accumulating moderately enriched uranium (20% U235 compared with 4% power-reactor grade and 0.7% natural uranium). 20% enrichment may be appropriate for the refuelling the US-supplied Tehran reactor (acquired in the Shah’s time) but is also closer to 85+% weapons-grade uranium. By the end of 2011, Iran had 100 kilogrammes of the stuff but then converted some to fuel-rods before steadily increasing once more to 200kg in September 2013 (see “Annual Defence Report”, p.36, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11 December 2013).
The deal agreed in Geneva means all of this material will either be diluted or converted to fuel-rods during the six-month negotiating period, with this being verifiable and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This alone is a potential confidence-building measure, but Iran will also refrain from bringing more enrichment centrifuge cascades online - again a verifiable action. In return Iran gets some sanctions relief and freeing up of frozen bank-accounts.
The deal contributes to an already distinct improvement in relations between Washington and Tehran, made possible in part by a coincidence of circumstances in both capitals. In Washington, Barack Obama’s second-term presidency is badly in need of a boost, and a sustainable deal with Iran could be the makings of his remaining three years in office; in Tehran, Hassan Rowhani retains a strong position following his election victory in June 2013, when he gained an overall majority in the first ballot against a cluster of four more hawkish opponents (see "Iran, a cautious opening", 20 June 2013).
The AIM factors
Against this, however, two major factors exist that could derail the negotiations. The first is Israel, whose prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu remains bitterlyopposed to the deal - but is even more frustrated because Israel has little in the way of military options. It could not seriously disrupt Iran’s nuclear programme through military strikes unless these somehow brought the US into the fray; and Obama simply will not even think of countenancing that.
Even so, the Israeli authorities will seek any sign of problems with the negotiations, as well as focusing on internal Iranian developments - including missile-tests and military exercises - as possible pretexts for action. They will be strongly supported in this by Saudi Arabia and the western Gulf monarchies, which are also exercised by the US-Iranian rapprochement, as well of course by the powerful pro-Israel lobby in the United States.
In these circumstances, the second major factor comes into play: that old process of “Accidents, Incidents and Mavericks” (see "America, Israel, Iran: mediation vs war", 16 February 2012) In normal circumstances these three elements can turn a major crisis between states into something far worse, but they also apply to inter-state relations when these are improving but face severe opposition. read more:
