Progress in Nagaland: EPW Editorial
The steady progress in the talks with Naga separatists opens up space for democratic solutions.
In recent days there have been stray news reports (including some speculative ones) which seem to suggest that there has been substantial progress towards ending the conflict between the Naga separatists and the Indian state. If these reports are correct, this would mark a major achievement for both the Naga movement as well as for the Indian state. These news reports suggest that both sides have made major concessions towards an honourable and just solution. While the Naga leadership may be willing to forgo total secession or even “Greater Nagalim”, the Indian state has reportedly agreed to a separate flag for Nagaland, a special status for Nagas within the Indian republic which will even be marked on their passports and some jurisdiction of the Naga authority over Nagas all over the country. These reports also suggest that the armed cadre of the separatists will be incorporated into Indian paramilitary forces and the Naga legislature will be known by its own name. In short, this implies a radical reworking of the Indian federal structure and the principles behind it and will require, at the very least, some important amendments to the Constitution of India.
The Naga movement for secession from India was inherited by the new nation state at the very moment of its independence. From before 1947, the political leadership of the Nagas has been consistently saying that it does not want to be part of the Indian Union and there is evidence to suggest that Gandhi too was keen that they should not be forced to remain if they did not wish to. However, that was not to be and as we know it has been 65 years of an intractable conflict. While dismissing demands for separation, India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, did try to make major concessions in local authority and self-governance to the Nagas including the creation of a separate Nagaland state. Later, the Shillong accord of 1975 attempted to give some more concessions and bring the separatist movement into the so-called “mainstream”. Unfortunately this too proved largely a failure.
The present round of negotiations, which began in July 1997 with the announcement of a ceasefire between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak-Muivah (NSCN – IM), has been very slow and largely out of the public gaze. This may have been its greatest strength in that both the parties to the negotiations have not been in a hurry to deliver. It also shows that within the Delhi establishment there is a broad area of agreement since these negotiations, initiated by the United Front government under I K Gujral, have continued through the National Democratic Alliance’s rule and then under the United Progressive Alliance. This is a good portent as is the commitment of both the Government of India and the NSCN leadership to stay the course and not, literally, jump the gun.
While most other political parties, in Nagaland and in Delhi, seem to be on board with the direction of these negotiations, it is essential that petty politicking and cussedness do not fracture the political consensus in Delhi. The response of the NSCN (Khaplang) faction too remains unclear. An agreement without their consent may be difficult to see through. More importantly, these proposals, while they do not talk of a redrawing of the state boundaries of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, do require political consent from the leadership and people of these states. It is still unclear whether that will be forthcoming and past experience gives little hope. It is crucial that along with the Naga separatist leadership, the people and political leadership of these states are also involved and made a party to the final agreement. Given the intensely complex and never-ending internecine conflicts in the region, even that may not be enough for there may yet remain small, yet deadly, militant groups determined to break any such agreement. This is a danger which requires preparedness, political flexibility and democratic space if it has to be successfully met. Unfortunately, the Indian state is known for exactly the opposite virtues in these regions. It will be worthwhile to see whether the leopard can change its spots.
A mutually acceptable settlement to the conflict between the Nagas and the Indian state, arrived at through negotiations, will have substantial implications well beyond the region. It will, firstly, lead to a democratisation of the federal structure of the Indian Union. Those who claim that the Naga leadership has accepted the Constitution through such a solution, should realise that such “acceptance” may alter the very nature of the federalism inscribed in it and open up another layer of sovereignty. It also indicates, for all the criticisms of the many acts of omission and commission of the Indian state, that there remains space for solutions to vexed conflicts. In the present context this holds hope for a similar flexibility on Kashmir. There too, like in Nagaland, the popular support for separation remains strong, but comes up against equally popular demands against it by smaller local populations and the Indian state has much to answer for, not least for the brutal manner of its “holding operation”. Apart from Kashmir, such a reworking of the Constitution, by signalling the flexibility of its very structure, will open up many possibilities for democratic solutions to many other seemingly difficult demands, like in other parts of the north-east region, Gorkhaland, Telangana and others.
