Gujarat 2002: Will We Ever Know the Truth?
The one thing this SIT report is not is a closure - either for victims of the Gujarat violence or for the investigation of what actually transpired in 2002 and the role Modi played as head of the state government: Hartosh Singh Bal
Much time has been spent on contrasting the SIT report with recommendations of the amicus curiae, but not enough attention has been paid to shortcomings of the SIT report as a whole. A number of articles have appeared examining specific details of the report and contrasting it with preliminary reports filed by the SIT and some of the contradictions in what witnesses told the SIT and Nanavati Commission inquiring into the Gujarat riots of 2002.
It has already been noted how the SIT feels that a ‘mere statement of alleged words [within] the four walls of a room does not constitute any offence’. In other words, the only way a chief minister commits an illegal act is if he actually leads a mob, or holds a public rally calling for violence. It has also been noted how the SIT has suggested that Ehsan Jafri provoked a mob by firing upon it, as if the 20,000 people gathered outside his home had come to have a discussion with him and would have let him go if he had not attempted to defend himself. It has also defended statements by Modi that suggest that the ‘firing’ by Jafri and massacre at Gulberg Society were part of a chain of ‘action and reaction’ that began at Godhra. According to the SIT, this statement has been taken out of context, but it fails to suggest a context in which such a statement would ever be defensible.
What is most disturbing is that this tone and tenor runs through the entire report. If officers who in the immediate aftermath of Godhra held firm and ensured violence did not take place were transferred within the same month, the report claims these were routine administrative actions. If senior officers who acted in a manner the administration seems to have preferred—thus inviting reason for criticism of their handling of the violence—were rewarded with plum government posts or post-retirement benefits, the SIT sees this only as evidence of their capabilities. If officials of the Modi administration were caught on tape tutoring witnesses, the SIT casts suspicion on the intentions of the person who attempted the clandestine recording.
Here, we consider some aspects of the report that have not been examined in detail yet. What they show is how the SIT has gone out of its way to disregard the evidence it has collected and reached conclusions that its own evidence does not allow for. Beyond the Gulberg massacre, the three aspects of the report excerpted here suggest 1) a role played by Modi, 2) involvement of the VHP, 3) how the Gujarat government acted against officers who did a good job immediately after the riots—including coming down heavily on elements of the Sangh, and 4) that senior figures of the government tutored witnesses...
Read more: http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/nation/will-we-ever-know-the-truth
Also see: Why Is Narendrabhai Afraid of the Indian Media?
Much time has been spent on contrasting the SIT report with recommendations of the amicus curiae, but not enough attention has been paid to shortcomings of the SIT report as a whole. A number of articles have appeared examining specific details of the report and contrasting it with preliminary reports filed by the SIT and some of the contradictions in what witnesses told the SIT and Nanavati Commission inquiring into the Gujarat riots of 2002.
It has already been noted how the SIT feels that a ‘mere statement of alleged words [within] the four walls of a room does not constitute any offence’. In other words, the only way a chief minister commits an illegal act is if he actually leads a mob, or holds a public rally calling for violence. It has also been noted how the SIT has suggested that Ehsan Jafri provoked a mob by firing upon it, as if the 20,000 people gathered outside his home had come to have a discussion with him and would have let him go if he had not attempted to defend himself. It has also defended statements by Modi that suggest that the ‘firing’ by Jafri and massacre at Gulberg Society were part of a chain of ‘action and reaction’ that began at Godhra. According to the SIT, this statement has been taken out of context, but it fails to suggest a context in which such a statement would ever be defensible.
What is most disturbing is that this tone and tenor runs through the entire report. If officers who in the immediate aftermath of Godhra held firm and ensured violence did not take place were transferred within the same month, the report claims these were routine administrative actions. If senior officers who acted in a manner the administration seems to have preferred—thus inviting reason for criticism of their handling of the violence—were rewarded with plum government posts or post-retirement benefits, the SIT sees this only as evidence of their capabilities. If officials of the Modi administration were caught on tape tutoring witnesses, the SIT casts suspicion on the intentions of the person who attempted the clandestine recording.
Here, we consider some aspects of the report that have not been examined in detail yet. What they show is how the SIT has gone out of its way to disregard the evidence it has collected and reached conclusions that its own evidence does not allow for. Beyond the Gulberg massacre, the three aspects of the report excerpted here suggest 1) a role played by Modi, 2) involvement of the VHP, 3) how the Gujarat government acted against officers who did a good job immediately after the riots—including coming down heavily on elements of the Sangh, and 4) that senior figures of the government tutored witnesses...
Read more: http://www.openthemagazine.com/article/nation/will-we-ever-know-the-truth
Also see: Why Is Narendrabhai Afraid of the Indian Media?
