Iraqi Kurds Seek Greater Balance between Ankara and Baghdad By Mohammed A. Salih
ERBIL, Dec 4 2014 (IPS) – After a period of frostiness,
Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Turkey seem intent on mending
ties, as each of the parties show signs of needing the other. But the Kurds
appear more cautious this time around, apparently leery of moving too close to Ankara lest they alienate the new Iraqi government in Baghdad with which they
signed a breakthrough oil deal Tuesday. It’s clear that despite the recent slide in relations, both
sides need each other. As a land-locked territory, Kurds will be looking for an
alternative that they can use to counter pressure from the central Iraqi
government.
The agreement, which will give Baghdad
greater control over oil produced in Kurdistan and Kurdish-occupied Kirkuk in exchange for the KRG’s receipt of a bigger share
of the central government’s budget, may signal an effort to reduce Erbil’s
heavy reliance on Turkey .
The warmth between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey was a rather strange affair
to begin with. It emerged unexpectedly and evolved dramatically, particularly
after the 2003 U.S.
invasion. Whereas Turkey is
a major player in the Middle East and Eurasia
regions, Iraqi Kurdistan is not even an independent state. The imbalance of
power between the two parties made their development of a “strategic”
relationship particularly remarkable.
And given the deep historical animosity in Ankara toward all things Kurdish, the change
of heart on its leaders’ part seemed almost miraculous, even if highly
lucrative to Turkish construction companies in particular. But those ties
suffered a major blow in August when the forces of Islamic State (IS) swept
into Kurdish-held territories in Iraq . With the IS threatening Kurdistan’s capital city, Erbil , Turkey Turkey had abandoned Iraqi Kurds in
the middle of a life-or-death crisis. KRG President Masoud Barzani, Ankara ’s closest ally, even felt moved to publicly thank Iran , Turkey ’s regional rival, for
rushing arms and other supplies to the Peshmerga in their hour of need.
In an attempt to simultaneously develop an understanding and
save face, some senior KRG officials defended Ankara ,
insisting that its hands were tied by the fact that more than 40 staff members
in its consulate in the Iraqi city of Mosul ,
including the consul himself, had been taken hostage by the IS. Other officials
were more critical, slamming Ankara
for not having acted decisively in KRG’s support. And the fact that Turkey was
experiencing elections where the ambitious then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan was running for the newly enhanced office of president was also invoked
as a reason for his reluctance to enter into war with such a ruthless foe.
It also appeared to observers here that Erdogan did not want
to do anything that could strengthen his arch-enemy, Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad, even if that meant effectively siding with the Sunni jihadists. But
last month’s visit to Iraq
by Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu appears to have helped repair the
relationship with the Kurds in the north. Davutoglu turned on his personal
charm to reassure his hosts, even visiting a mountainous area where Turkish
special forces are now training members of Peshmerga and a Turkish-built
refugee camp for Iraqis displaced by the war.
The question of how long it takes for the relationship to
bounce back to the point where it was six months ago is anyone’s guess. But
it’s clear that despite the recent slide in relations, both sides need each
other. As a land-locked territory, Kurds will be looking for an alternative
that they can use to counter pressure from the central Iraqi government. Focused on laying the foundation for a high degree of
economic and political autonomy – if not independence — from Baghdad, the Kurds’
strategic ambition is to be able to control and ideally sell their oil and gas
to international clients. And geography dictates that the most obvious and
economically efficient route runs through Turkey ,
with or without Baghdad ’s
blessing.
As for Ankara ,
Iraqi Kurdistan is now its only friend in an otherwise hostile region. Once
upon a time, not long ago, politicians in Ankara
boasted of the success of their “zero-problems-with-neighbours” policy that had
reshuffled regional politics and turned some of Turkey ’s
long-standing foes in the region, including Syria , into friends. But that era
is now gone. Ankara has come to see Iraqi
Kurdistan as a potential major supplier of its own energy needs and has
generally sided with the KRG in its disputes with Baghdad . At the same time, however, Kurdish leaders have been
criticised here for putting most of their eggs in Ankara ’s basket.
The last time Kurds invested so much of their trust in a
neighbouring country was during in the 1960s and 1970s when the Shah of Iran
supported their insurgency as a means of exerting pressure on Baghdad . When the Shah abruptly abandoned
Kurds in return for territorial concessions by the government of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein in the Shatt al-Arab River separating southern Iran from Iraq in 1975, the results were
catastrophic.
While that process has now begun, it remains unclear how far
both sides will go. Will it be again a case of Ankara
and Erbil jointly versus Baghdad , or will Erbil play the game differently this time, aiming for
greater balance between the two capitals. Indeed, the much-lauded oil deal
struck Tuesday between the Baghdad and the KRG may indicate a preference for
the latter strategy, particularly in light of their mutual interest in both
confronting IS and compensating for losses in revenue resulting from the steep
plunge in oil prices. Still, given the history of deals sealed and then broken
that have long characterised relations between the Kurds and Baghdad , nothing can be taken for granted.
