Prashant Jha - Nepal crisis deepens as Madhes movement marks 100 days
NB: Those who imagined the Maoist armed struggle and the revolution of 2006 to be a harbinger of fundamental change in Nepal may now consider what has prompted the various Marxist-Leninists to compromise with traditional caste and political elites and even ally with reactionary politicians in order to crush Madhesi aspirations. Madhesis were ardent supporters of the revolution, but are now treated as 'anti-national' - a term of abuse we are familiar with in India. What happened to proletarian internationalism comrades? To workers solidarity across ethnic divisions? You should hang your heads in shame. DS
Monday marked the 100th day of the Madhesi-Tharu mass
movement in Nepal’s southern plains -- right across India’s border. The
struggle, which began in mid-August to prevent a ‘discriminatory constitution’,
has transitioned into seeking substantial amendments in the statute and revision
of federal boundaries once it was promulgated.
But with Kathmandu’s establishment unwilling to concede
ground and responding with a strong security crackdown, the Madhes ‘andolan’ is
on the verge of taking an even more radical turn. Over the weekend, four people
were killed in Saptari district when protestors sought to block movement of
vehicles on the highway at night -- and police responded with what local human
rights groups are terming as excessive use of force and indiscriminate firing.
India had seen the dangers of such a constitution, urged
Nepali leaders to take dissenters on board, and has tried to convince the
Nepali leadership to listen to its own people and seek a political solution. Unfortunately, Kathmandu’s hill upper-caste establishment --
led by Prime Minister KP Oli -- has dug its heels in, stoked ultra-nationalism
and chauvinism to hide its own failures, and deepened internal instability.
The crisis
Madhesis complain that the Constitution compromises the
architecture of political representation, affirmative action, federalism, and
citizenship. It shrinks the number of constituencies in the Tarai; it reduces
the share of proportional representation component of the electoral system
which had inbuilt quotas for excluded groups; it envisages that provinces would
send an equal number of representatives to the Upper House rather than base
representation from states on population.
All of this would erode Madhesi political strength. It
dilutes the principle of reservation. And it gerrymanders the federal
boundaries in a way where 12 out of the 20 districts in the plains are merged
with the hills -- the Madhes-dominated province in the eastern Tarai is left
resource-deprived, and Tharus are reduced to a political minority in the west.
The Madhesi anger is not just about the content of the
Constitution, it is about the fact that the bigger parties rammed through a
constitution despite the boycott of Madhesi forces and made little effort to
engage with them. Add to this the background where Madhesis have always felt
stripped of dignity and of being treated as ‘outsiders’ and it adds to a potent
mix of sentiments, driving alienation.
The agitation parties now want a ‘package deal’ to address
all these issues. To step up the agitation, they decided to block the border in
September, and disrupt the flow of goods and supplies to Kathmandu. This has
caused acute shortages in the valley.
Nepal government has termed it an undeclared Indian
blockade, while Delhi said the problem erupted because of internal protests in
Nepal and the government should resolve it and create ‘security and harmony’ in
Tarai, to enable ‘uninterrupted commerce’.
The truth has multiple components. The Madhesis have blocked
the border; the Indians have sent a signal to customs and security officials
not to actively cooperate in enabling movement given the security situation;
and transporters feel insecure because of the risks of violence on the other
side.
Oli’s ploy
Kathmandu, under Oli, appears to have embarked on a
three-pronged policy. One, it wants to tire out the protestors. This has not
succeeded, for even 100 days after the movement kicked off, there is remarkable
energy and mass participation in the andolan. The cry of ‘aar ki paar’, ‘abhi
nahin toh kabhi nahin’ is being chanted across the Tarai, and leaders have been
told not to surrender at any cost. Instead, the mood is only getting more
radical, and the methods more aggressive.
Two, it wants to crush the protestors. A few weeks ago, the
police burnt tents and sought to remove those blocking the border at Birgunj,
the key junction which accounts for 70% of the traffic from India. But this resulted in an escalation of the agitation.
Security forces once again used force to remove those sitting on the highway on
Saturday night but this has not deterred thousands from joining the andolan.
Now, there is talk of deploying the Nepal Army. The army has
sensibly told the political leadership this requires a political solution. But
Oli, in a meeting with other parties, has said he would use all means available
with the Nepali state to break the protests. The fact that the ethnic make-up of security forces
(dominated by hill castes) is distinct from that of the protestors feeds the
Madhesi narrative of internal colonialism, and encourages radical sentiments.
And three, Kathmandu wants to ‘scare’ India -- by playing
the ‘China card’, stoking ‘anti Indianism’, and internationalising the
‘blockade’ issue. China agreed to gift 1000 metric tonnes of fuel, and signed
a commercial deal with Nepal. But the China card was probably more effective
and potent as long as it was not played. By playing it, Nepal has exposed its limits. Geography and
costs make it unviable for Beijing to send in tankers of fuels to meet Nepal’s
needs. The gift barely met a day of two of Nepal’s requirements; the commercial
deal is yet to take off and the instruments and infrastructure to
operationalise it are missing.
Madhesi leaders have also told China they would view this as
an unfriendly act, and a Chinese flag has been burnt in the Tarai. China has
told India that they too seek stability in Nepal, and this stability is
possible only with the accommodation of the Madhes. Beijing will seek to make
inroads, but it is unlikely this will alter the geo strategic balance in Nepal.
There is, even in normal times, latent resentment in
Kathmandu against India -- and so it is easy to build on it, and create a narrative
that Madhesis (who have traditionally been viewed as Indians or Indian
‘agents’) are only doing Delhi’s bidding. By painting the blockade as solely India’s doing, the
establishment can play this narrative up. But Delhi is all too familiar with
this tradition of Nepali political forces instrumentally creating hatred for
India. The opposition to Indian intervention is actually an invitation to a
different form of Indian intervention -- where Kathmandu wants Delhi to tell
the Madhesis to give up their struggle, settle for token changes, and postpone
key questions like federalism.
India, well aware of the intensity of the Madhesi
alienation, has stayed away from doing so. And this has infuriated Oli. ‘Internationalising’ the ‘blockade’ is a strategy with mixed
benefits for Nepal for the simple reason that internationals cannot ignore the
fact that Madhesi presence at the border is a strong reason for the ‘blockade’
in the first place.
The fact that all other routes except Birgunj have seen
movement of vehicles -- albeit in more limited numbers -- also diminishes the
claims that the blockade is absolute. Media commentaries in Kathmandu are now
pointing to the smuggling of fuel products, lack of management of available
petroleum, institutionalised corruption and government incompetence for
exacerbating the crisis.
Nepal faces the risk of exposing its own internal
vulnerability -- on both the question of a contested constitution and its human
rights record -- on international platforms. In Geneva, India –- in a rare and
surprising move –- raised the issue of Nepali state committing human rights
violations in the Tarai. During PM Narendra Modi’s visit, India and UK jointly
agreed to the need for an inclusive and lasting constitutional settlement in
Nepal. Delhi has not really invested its diplomatic capital internationally on
any large scale, but if it decides to do so, it is obvious that Nepal would
have a tough time countering it.
Staying the course
There is now a deadlock. Kathmandu’s establishment does not
want to budge -- with Oli calculating this is making him a ‘nationalist hero’
though there is a slight turn in the public mood, with many in the media and
civil society increasingly asking the government to find a political solution
to the crisis. Oli’s government is fragile and with increasing public
disillusionment, it is possible that the political alignment will change. But
this is probably not a solution for you need the support of all sides,
including Oli’s party, to pass the amendments.
For its part, the Madhesi agitation is growing in intensity;
rallies are planned across the plains. And Madhesi parties may even declare a
parallel constitution soon.
For India, it is not a pleasant situation. But diplomacy is
often not pleasant and a regional power sometimes has to do what it has to do.
Indian policy has faced flak internally for not ‘welcoming’ the Nepali
Constitution, for ‘intervening’ in Nepal’s internal affairs, for ‘taking
sides’. But the fact is that Indian stance must be seen in the context of Delhi’s
intimate involvement in Nepal’s internal affairs historically. Inaction at a
time of such turbulence across the open border was not an option.
Indian policy is guided by both liberal and realist impulses
at the moment. It is backing the right ‘values’, of inclusion, of minority
rights, of accommodation of dissent through peaceful political means; it is
encouraging a political structure that takes into account diversity of Nepal;
it is opposing state brutality, human rights violations, including on international
platforms.
It is also a ‘realist’ policy because India can see that if
the Madhesi question is not accommodated within the constitutional framework,
the agitation in Tarai would grow. All the ingredients for a separatist movement are in place
in Tarai -- an ethno-nationalist movement, minority alienation, state
brutality, a ruling elite and security apparatus of a distinct ethnic make-up,
and cross border linkages.
India cannot afford such a movement right across its open
border. The memories of Sri Lanka are all too fresh. And that is why Delhi
needs to stay the course as it encourages the reluctant ruling elite to share
power with its minorities. It may be a villain in Kathmandu today, but Delhi is
doing a huge favour to the Nepali state by advising it consistently to find a
solution within a united Nepal before it is too late.
100 days into a mass movement, there is only one answer to
the crisis in Nepal -- Kathmandu needs to wake up and to listen to its own
citizens of the plains.
